時(shí)間：4月21日下午14：30-16：00
地點(diǎn)：主樓317
報(bào)告人：中國(guó)人民大學(xué) 袁蓉麗教授
報(bào)告人簡(jiǎn)介：
中國(guó)人民大學(xué)商學(xué)院教授、博士生導(dǎo)師、財(cái)政部全國(guó)會(huì)計(jì)領(lǐng)軍人才。主要研究領(lǐng)域包括公司財(cái)務(wù)、公司治理。已在Journal of Banking & Finance、Journal of Corporate Finance 、Journal of Business Finance & Accounting、《管理世界》等國(guó)際國(guó)內(nèi)核心期刊發(fā)表論文四十余篇，中國(guó)人民大學(xué)商學(xué)院教學(xué)杰出教授，主講的《會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)》課程獲評(píng)北京高?！皟?yōu)質(zhì)本科課程”，是第十三屆“全國(guó)百篇優(yōu)秀管理案例”獲得者。
報(bào)告內(nèi)容簡(jiǎn)介：
We examine China’s July 2020 introduction of US style securities class action lawsuits (SCA). Unlike US evidence, Chinese stock prices respond positively to SCA introduction. This is consistent with a placebo test that finds insignificant responses for cross-listed stocks already subject to US SCA. Price reactions to temporary SCA rules suggest that discouraging frivolous lawsuits is beneficial. Effects are stronger for firms more exposed to SCA, particularly with poor disclosure or governance, state ownership, political connections, no D&O insurance, or less innovation. Firms react to SCA by initiating D&O insurance, selecting more reputable auditors, and improving internal controls and financial reporting. Thus, the threat of SCA risk appears to benefit shareholders.
（承辦：會(huì)計(jì)系、科研與學(xué)術(shù)交流中心）
